

General  
Notes on Ball, Sept 80

- ANW's driving of "second strike cap." as  
ideology for US strat. force size.  
see his demonstration of vulnerability of attacks by SU  
on US ~~defense~~ force.

- Goldwater campaign: US 4x1 in op. land missiles b. 135  
(better with Polaris, etc.)

Now, Reagan....!

+ Carter II:

116-17  
h. 138-39

190 US x 430 SU (10?)

+ 75 Polaris?

DE strategy 377 on

396 VFK on US FS! March 1962 Sat Eve Post, also op  
March 22 (23 NYT)

(and, Am. Airlines as FS ~~that~~!)

Revised April 9, 1962 b. 32

397 (MAD: McN, also, Sat Eve Post Nov 62)

399 Options/D/L as "2nd strike": really, an intention to  
SU to avoid cities in 2nd strike (or FS: now!)

Va. MAD - 179 Jan 64

181 - Taylor in Aug 63

399

406

Posture statement, <sup>for</sup> 1964 F/N 1965

us. "cities only"



meant to!  
FS cap-!

- 519 (Struct. policy" may have influenced force size in turn of a covert struct. policy! see FS, below, 514): superior
- 417 (Alt. hypothesis: tacit FS cap., as measure of necessary "advising" and force size).

Declaratory policy as a rational for force size — though in turn of AD, MM force was too large.

- 507 Ideology of "superiority": in context of gap indication (i.e. on basis of SU effort to gain superiority, & even likelihood!)  
(late 1975-80!)

- 508 Did NSTAP even change, after 1964-65?

- 510: US proposes freeze in 1964-66, <sup>too late: after Cuba II</sup> till SU starts to wind up in late 1966!

FS/PU/LW 512

FS 514

467-68  
in 456-457



Lophie Vaneberg

Hert:

- Hearings, 1957-61
- Cambridge storage (office?)
- DOD Canteen
- FOIA - NIE's?
- Study of Kaplan: (Forney Kaplan)
- Schles RAND papers
  - (Know
  - HAK
  - Schelling
  - Kahn
- (1980 - 20 years after OTW!)
- Blackman - book
- Steph Kaplan - ARPA? (ACDA?) Study

Organize: FU session  
AAAS

2118 8th St.  
Baltimore  
Sat. night  
7

Call on Monahan  
Berkely High



1. US nuclear 1000 MM  
 54 J<sup>th</sup>  
 656 Polaris  
 1710 in last half of 1967

Unit that like SC no. of warheads, by early 70's  
 (pre-MIRV)?

2. Unprecedented rate + scale of strategic  
 deployment of JFK — like how in Cuba II!  
 see McNamara...  
 (SC missiles: for EU threats!)

3. The program can be explained by missile  
 gap, Cong pressure —  
 but JFK's?

4. See my McNamara Econ Club speech!

5. See JFK buildup of strat. forces as part  
 of general buildup to a more active  
 international policy! SF; ground troops;  
 transport; CIA? (Vietnam?)  
 VN; Laos; Cuba (I; Bay of Pigs; missile; invasion?)  
 Tuzilla; Congo (Lumumba!); (Berlin);  
 (BUT: with JFK as catalyst: like Castro?!  
 vs. ? Cabinet: McNamara, Rusk, Bundy, McNamara,  
 DeLoach)

6. JFK preceded by "missile gap" (at low bluffs, does)  
 just as Castro preceded by Committee for Peace in  
 Cuba in last years of "passive" Rusk's handling détente! [US-KOREA]



— VN as "end of the Korean syndrome" —  
"New game, without nuclear"

- On LBJ: an Challenge to CBJ, 1964
- RUSK TO CHANG + KHANH ON NUCS
  - SEABORN
  - LOOGE

(but an Horatio on the land)

BALL

p. 16

- US (McElroy) bluffed as to true appreciation of strat. balance, in opposite direction (to get away) from low bluff (to save away!)

US sought to maintain asymmetrical superiority;  
SU (K) sought to maintain (same, i.e.) asymmetrical inferiority. \*\* A "deal"!

\* by claiming imminent inferiority

\*\* by claiming (to SC military, allies?)  
current or imminent superiority!

"restoring"

- JFK called for "superiority," 1958

HE WAS WARNED OFF "GAD" IN 1960!

- Powers call for \$1B/yr in aid — for '60!  
(accidents)

A. 37

JFK endorses, Feb 29, 1960 (

- JFK relied on Health and Reel. Reports.

V2 — JFK told of (low) NIE's.



McN, DE, Kaufman on CF

(Goldberg, Rosenberg):

- Parrish - Richardson - White<sup>(?)</sup> (earlier, Schmitt,  
Lydon, Walker, <sup>\*</sup>Drigley) (Brodie; Marshall - Goldhamer?)  
were attracted to "no cities/CF" in 1960-61 as a  
way of

(b) continuing threat from Polaris, which might

(Ray was never in favor of  
"city-busting" as a form of FS,  
or all-out war in 2nd strike:  
rather, "graduated response.")

- sell mini deterrent (in era of missiles)  
(Bunker) [Prize essay: "Nuclear Deterrence and  
Graduated Response"]  
or Paul -  
- take over mi. det. mission

\* (earlier: selling U-2 flights, and concessions?) (Hughes, Stok, Rockefeller)

(b) Continuing threat from Ang, to take on  
demonstration of ABM.

(c) Selling B-70;  
and large numbers of MM!

[? (d) pressing FS/FC threats, in era of SU missiles?  
at least maintaining current forces (+MM, B-70) + USAF ult.]

(e) (no, earlier:

(Rosenberg): Creation of JSTPS at SAC ~~to~~ built up  
SAC, created on institutional bases that made it  
"impossible" to reduce forces, to reduce arms or  
targets (from "capabilities" represented in count of  
planes, which assumed the necessity for at least  
all current forces).

Goldberg: McN received from "no cities/CF/D-1" as declaratory  
policy because of public reaction to Am Author (and USAF  
pressure based on it? and, later, Colson II?!). But USAF commented  
to it is about late '62, same time that McN was regretting losing interest in it -



so McN did not implement it, with - offensive systems, 27  
C<sup>3</sup>, or nuclear on planes.

Options described by Ball were represented, by tier of  
SIOP '63 (from '62) as A, B, C categories:

A - strat nuc (including air defense? whether  
near cities or not?)

B - other military

C - Under Industrial.

A, or A+B, designated as "prompter options."

(Withholding on China; and on C. Perhaps also Moscow.\*)

\* (Notion of hitting Command + Com seems a danger  
from days when SU had no survivable nuclear forces.  
Removal of this on it seems totally without rationale:  
insane, suicidal. And that applies to, Command! and  
Intelligence, and Damage Assessment: at any stage of the  
war.

Admitted, if you recognize desirability of avoiding  
prompter exp., (+ rejecting FU threats: ~~from~~ because)

- 1) the lead to FU: by one side or the other;
- 2) the regime and lead to escalation / prompter exp.  
on both sides, leading to 3) continued and more,  
+ his own 4) crisis instability (and FU threats + implementation).

then you should exclude hard-target CF (just as SU, esp.  
should exclude ASW);

esp. since SU ICBMs are often near cities.



Drawing: "Possible to give up options, capability, D-L, coercion, in a war: and 'CW is a war.'"  
(Only 'peace', disavowal, allow reductions.  
esp. in advantage of SU harding + SLBMs (which are result of even II?)  
(impossible, 1962-63?)  
(Ev 3, 1983)

July 4, 1983

McN "mistake": 2d-strike D-L; vs. Minimum Det, Det Only: reduced forces

McN in 1962, by keeping alive the D-L criterion, as "2d strike D-L," (and not pressing quickly for agreed US-SU Thrup - test ban, flight test ban - reductions; or agreed ban MIRV testing)  
has notion alive, to be implemented on big basis when that again become feasible in '70's, with MIRV + accuracy.

(Even though he held down implementation in '60's: B-70 (Hoff!);

ABM, CD, large number of MM

(partly because of VN affair! Which cut its start the prospects, along with that security!)

In DPM '62, McN identified USAF as "full FS cap"  
(though USAF may be called for "credible FS cap" -

"Whereas, 2d-strike D-L, includes coercion, is direct insurance"  
[No - should have gone for "graduated deterrence", non-CK - vs. - hard targets; and NFU.)]

McN denied feasibility of credible FS that, after mid-60's (SU SLBMs + hardening!); "we have found this does not deter limited aggression..." "and to build up non-acc cap. (Also: denial usefulness. And pointed to huge cost.)

(Ev to Iran: feasible FS cap. may back up, elements, strong non-acc cap., plus the acc, plus thrust protection cap....

(US not be as strong or, or stronger than, SU at any level of cooperation [except, perhaps, at non-acc level: assuming willingness to neg on the acc side: which the regime's equality or superiority at any higher level, including a credible that of proportion escalating - c.j. as presumption [if both sides have this!]

[SU is choosing its "cooperate" in strengthening US presumption that: in order to, and at cost of, strengthening its presumption that. Each - US + SU - clearly prefers both to have a "limited mutually unlabeled" [not a "credible" but indefinite: neither is trying to close it for themselves, esp. US/Russia], than for neither to be unlabeled.

"Dangerous Game":  
Madman's Bluff;  
"Sticky Hair-tigger fingers"

(Wf) does SU want this? Doesn't it control whether big war occurs in Europe? Given rather to + ME current, it may think not!  
OR - it may want to threaten Berlin or to threaten US through elsewhere!



Rowley: CM is desirable: for non-arc workbooks,  
replacement of carriers (in Indian ocean):

(Really: undesirable for him to say otherwise, to Navy.  
But — may be unstoppable: perhaps on SU side, too.  
("Must get Navy

Will SU accept reductions in ICBMs, while US  
multiplies CMs? (Will this cost the big air defense system?)

Hyp on McN '61-'62: D-L — rationalizing current forces —  
was his contribution to USAF for (handing off Min Det)  
for putting a ceiling on forces. & a tacit bargain.

likewise, high, but limited, danger criticism for  
AD (rationalizing current forces: requiring full  
achievement of trial, and using "conservative" calculations  
(e.g. ignoring fire and fallout: + ecological/social effects!)

Perhaps McN hoped agreements would eventually limit  
forces & even limit reductions: over SU had built up  
(by 1967...);

but he did not foresee "return of CF", loss of  
FS threat with MIRV & accuracy;

plus desire need for this, with fall of Saigon,  
Tehran, and Monrovia (and SU support — including  
"satellite" troops — in Cambodia, Angola, Ethiopia; Afghanistan;  
(Central America?))

[Hyp: with risk is responding to each other's recent  
moves, so much as exploiting latest technology (to counteract  
oth's past moves of hardening missiles); though each  
does stimulate oth to "acquire prompter capability"

(and then — to protect against oth's, to extent possible, while  
waiting one's own. US is unlikely to leave SU with threat against on whole  
land-based forces, while we can only part of this. (100 MX vs MM holes?)

(+ disruptive  
being?)  
(or, 300 MX  
MM holes in  
North?!)  
for MM-III?



DE + FS threats:

- I did support a "tough" policy on Berlin 1961 (Khrushchev) and Cuba II (1962) — and am troops — to VN, Spring 1965.

— all of these involved threats (or war) of US troops — and is retrospect, all of these involved threat of FC of miss, "ultimatum" (e.g. if Cuba II had led to SU blockade of Berlin or attack on Turkey; or if SU had not backed down over Berlin; or if invasion of NVN had come about ... ) (or, China entered ...).

— Yet I would have denied this at the time, and have never been conscious of it —

because I was so sure (i.e. 30-year-old naïveté) that these threats or actions would not lead to escalation; opponent would back down before that; or, in case of VN, we would, if necessary, before it came to "that."

(Like CBS, who was sure he would not send 500,000 troops? JFK, likewise?

Like my junior, who was sure he would not be liared by his TS chairman — because it was obvious I was guilty! (before being evidence).

("My apparent conflict of interest can't bias my conclusion — since it is miserably self-evident what the court conclusion is ".')

— But by 1964-65-67 I had experienced a real war! (Like Castro's experience of hostage raid!)

JFK — PT boat (probably had not been trained, "What to do if hit by an enemy destroyer"); and esp. Cuba II (and Cuba I) and VN under French!)



(on 15th - Eval. of Mr. Strat. Doctor)

Why was not <sup>DE-</sup>BNSP optics policy  
implemented?

2) Supremacy - no urgency.  
(on for FS)

3) With ~~policy~~ belief SU would let  
spring present. (1963-67)

4) With approaching party, little interest  
in FU threats (incl. CBV) or FS;  
SACT? Detente?

- Till Schlesinger (RAND) - mid-73 - little  
tendency to challenge USAF  
intention?

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~~DATA~~ "TARGET" = "CITY"  
(hst, p. 140)

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Reed McN/DK

Yano/DE

Yano/DE (Halberstadt)

an hst 144

Rues to Europe!

Non-mre defense / increases in mngt!  
(break!)

Reaffirming <sup>on record</sup> - "double-barrelled"  
(see Buns, Mezanaden)

like "am and negot" on TXW -

approach strategy "non-rare option":  
w/ bother?

For "lack of interest" is tested in the context

(Which includes : MCV lack of  
will to make positive effort on this  
line ; failure to see "good grounds for opposing";  
" " " " " " " " " " " "  
" " " " " " " " " " " "  
(Cite : N, P/CM to Europe...)



X

[ Wf did not END-ers resist  
movement of the meas to Europe?!  
Before 1961 ; or 1961-67! (4000 to Eur.)  
ALL same issues!

(of dis copy ; while  
claiming to copy : Human-control  
Delegation  
Pre-emption.

Instead of SAC...

Lamine, JFK built up FS-Cap.

See your point, on move to TN  
"the" weapons.

(Kumsan).



- Reviews: - ~~Althaus~~ / Am. Anthro. ~~species~~ 1962  
- Econ. Club (NATO) ~~species~~ 1963  
- Hilpatero 61  
- VFK Aug '61



Meaning of "forces large enough  
to avoid allies being 'corrupted'  
by SU" ?

at all levels

- So superior / CF cap. that

1) US has a credible FC/EC/FS  
threat

and (2) SU does not.

TNW  
LSW

Above all (?) : cap. for "limited  
Strat. Retal." (against limited  
or threat SU one initiation or response  
threat)

(which might be threatened to "correct"  
Euro; <sup>OR FOR US FS.</sup> Ideas, the US that weakens  
cred. of such threats, and  
discourages (not, "deters") them.

Eff. might can be deterred, by fear  
of US, pre-emption.

(all-out FS?)